

































































The design of election laws as part of 
electoral systems has notable political 
consequences for states and societies. 
Sartori (1968: 273) wrote that electoral 
systems are "the most specific manipu-
lation instrument of politics" for a good 
reason. His famous words refer not only 
to political and interparty competition, 
but they can also be applied to deeply 
divided societies. In fact, discussions 
about election laws in deeply divided 
societies are often more than mere com-
petition between political parties and 
groups. Questioning election laws in 
societies marked by deeply ethnic divi-
sions means going deeper.
This questioning process seems to be 
happening to Bosnia and Herzegovi-
na (B-H), a country composed of two 
asymmetrical territorial entities: the 
Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS) 
and the Bosniak-Croat Federation.1 The 
1 For practical reasons, in this paper the 
Federation of B-H is defined as Bosniak-
Croat. The definition is correct if we con-
sider that the Federation is composed of 
1.56 million (70.4%) Bosniaks and 498,000 
(22.4%) Croats. Furthermore, until the 
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political crisis that accompanies ethnic 
division between Bosniaks and Croats 
deepened following the event in which 
the Constitutional Court of B-H par-
tially accepted on 6 December 2016 an 
appeal submitted by Božo Ljubić, as 
Chairman of the House of Represen-
tatives of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of B-H and Croatian representative, in 
which he questioned the constitutiona-
lity of parts of Election Law. The Con-
stitutional Court gave the Parliamentary 
Assembly six months to revise some of 
the obligatory rules of the Election Law. 
However, during this period, the Par-
liamentary Assembly failed to reach a 
consensus, which resulted in the Court's 
removal of the aforementioned conten-
tious provisions on 1 December 2016. 
The provisions that required adjusting 
refer to the nomination of delegates of 
the three constituent peoples (Bosniaks, 
Croats and Serbs) and Others from can-
tonal assemblies to the House of Peoples 
of the Parliament of the Federation, an 
institution thought to represent consti-
tuent peoples and national minorities' 
interests. In fact, for many years, Cro-
atian politicians have claimed that Bo-
sniaks nominate an important number 
of their delegates to the Federation's 
House of Peoples. As the Constitutional 
Court ruled the provisions unconstitu-
tional, not adhering to them could lead 
to a total deadlock. Although politicians 
have made some proposals for a new 
Election Law and its amendments, there 
are still some doubts on the legal imple-
mentation of the results of the general 
election that took place in October 2018.
beginning of 2000s, they were the only two 
constituent peoples that composed insti-
tutions based on ascriptive criteria. After 
the Federation of B-H's constitutional 
reform, which was imposed by the Office 
of the High Representative in 2000s, Serbs 
(56,000 or 2.5%) and Others (3.9%) (FZS 
2013) have also become constituent groups 
within the Federation. 
The paper will mainly focus on the 
relations between Bosniaks and Croats 
within the Federation. These two con-
stituent peoples are the largest group of 
the entity and have been afflicted by a 
crisis deeply rooted in political history. 
The Bosniak-Croat relation is certainly 
becoming one of the most tensed and 
destabilizing in the Balkans (Foreign 
Policy 2018, The Guardian 2018).
This article conceptualises and dis-
cusses the strong clash between the dif-
ferent understandings of democracy in 
societies that face changes in electoral 
rules. In this respect, the challenges af-
fecting the Election Law and arising 
from a discrepancy in the points of 
view of Bosniak and Croat leaders could 
confirm that the liberal critics of con-
sociation (beside the clash on under-
standings equality, as demonstrated by 
McCrudden and O'Leary 2013a, 2013b) 
have been arguing on two different un-
derstandings of democracy itself.
The article is based on secondary 
sources as well as on the following pri-
mary sources: newspaper articles pub-
lished online, documents issued by do-
mestic political parties, and internation-
al organisations. The article is divided 
into three parts.
In the first part, the article explains the 
struggles between Bosniak and Croat 
political elites for the imposition of re-
spectively majoritarian or power-shar-
ing system since 1990s. The second part 
of this paper discusses the decisions of 
the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) in the cases Sejdić and Fin-
ci v. B-H and Zornić v. B-H, as well as 
the Constitutional Court B-H decision 
U-23/14 on the unconstitutionality of 
some articles of the Election Law. The 
root of the latter decision dates back to 
2000 and 2002, when the international 
community imposed new electoral ar-

































































ciational model. The lack of key conso-
ciational arrangements in the Election 
Law increased divisions between the two 
ethnic communities. The article consid-
ers the Constitutional Court's decision 
as a step towards the return of consoci-
ation and the annulment of centripetal 
trends in B-H. The final part discusses 
the proposals of election rules submitted 
to both the Parliamentary Assembly of 
B-H and the Parliament of the Federa-
tion of B-H, as proposed by Bosniak and 
Croat parties. It also briefly explains the 
proposals filed by domestic non-govern-
mental organisations. The article proves 
its hypothesis that long-term polariza-
tion of the understanding of democracy 
has been one of the key causes of polit-
ical divergence between the two ethnic 
communities in the Federation.
A theoretical perspective: where 
does democracy come from 
in deeply divided societies
In a normative discussion, O'Flynn 
(2010: 283) considers the relation 
between individuals and ethnic groups 
in ethnically deeply divided societies. 
He points out that "democracy requi-
res governments to treat everyone with 
equal concern and respect, because ul-
timately that is what his or her moral 
standing demands". However, he adds 
that "in deeply divided societies, it is 
often claimed that groups, too, can be 
valuable in their own right". Most im-
portantly, O'Flynn argues that individu-
al and group rights are compatible and 
can be appeased.
Yet, at first glance, it is noticeable that 
the vision of democracy for "individuals" 
and "ethnic groups" differs. In order to 
appease these visions, which should re-
flect the interests of both individuals and 
ethnic groups, several theoretical ap-
proaches have been developed. In ethni-
cally divided societies they try to permit 
all groups, including minorities, to be in-
cluded in polity. These approaches could 
be classified in two major categories: 
centripetalism and consociationalism.
Centripetalism is an integrative ap-
proach that requires moderation from 
the political elite. It enables politicians 
who are ready to cross ethnic borders 
to be elected by all ethnic groups, and 
not only by the group whose candidate 
they are. Political institutions should be 
designed to avoid political extremism, 
which could offset negative characteris-
tics that are present in deeply ethnically 
divided societies, such as discrimination 
and ethnic violence, as well as "pull pol-
iticians and their supporters towards a 
'moderate middle'" (McCulloch 2013: 
111). Centripetalism is also defined as a 
"strategy designed to focus competition 
at the moderate centre rather than the 
extremes" with three facilitating com-
ponents: (1) the existence of electoral 
incentives for politicians to attract votes 
from ethnic groups other than their 
own; (2) the existence of multi-ethnic 
arenas of bargaining; (3) the develop-
ment of centrist and multi-ethnic parties 
and coalitions that are "capable of mak-
ing cross-ethnic appeals" (Reilly 2001: 
11, 2012: 263).2 The approach suggests 
that "moderate political parties will find 
it easier to engage in cross-group coop-
eration" and reach political stability, just 
as it seeks to guarantee "both individual 
and group identities" in deeply divided 
societies (McCulloch 2013: 112). To do 
so, centripetalism favours political sys-
tems established on a combination of 
majoritarian and preferential rules that 
permit cross-ethnic elections based on 
Alternative Vote (AV) systems (Horow-
itz 1985; Reilly 2001: 264).3
2 Italics are Reilly's. 
3 McCulloch (2013: 113) listed variations of 
the AV used in some countries, such it is the 
Limited Preferential Voting system (LPV) 
used in Papua New Guinea and Sri Lanka's 



























Critics of this approach exist among 
theoreticians and empiricists alike. The-
oretically, consociational proponents 
"criticise integrationists for ignoring 
the reality of divisions on the ground 
and for exaggerating the basis for uni-
ty" (McGarry and O'Leary 2005: 675). 
Empirically, Fraenkel and Grofman 
(2006: 646) studied the case of Fiji and 
concluded that "Horowitz's theory failed 
to work as expected in Fiji owing to sev-
eral inherent flaws". On the other hand, 
McCulloch (2013: 113) regrouped 24 
states in which elections were held and 
then argued that "only four achieved the 
anticipated centripetal result of modera-
tion and greater stability". Similarly, at-
tempts by the international community 
to switch from consociation to certain 
centripetal elements in B-H, in particu-
lar the ones based on cross-ethnic votes 
and moderation, have been producing 
divisions between ethnic communities 
(Pepić and Kasapović 2017).
Consociation is an approach attrib-
uted to Lijphart (1969, 1977). This ap-
proach assumes a presence of a deeply 
segmented society whose elites decide to 
cooperate in order to maintain stability. 
Four basic principles are characteristic 
of consociation. First, a grand coalition 
composed of representatives of all signif-
icant segments. They participate in deci-
sion-making process and represent their 
segments. Second, veto is another key 
element that prevents possible outvoting 
for the protection of minority segments' 
vital interests. Third, proportionality is 
used as an objective tool for resource al-
location and representation in common 
institutions. Finally, segmental autonomy, 
often accompanied by federal elements 
(Lijphart 1979), allowing distinguished 
policies and independent decisions on 
the interests of specific groups.
Originally, consociation has been 
thought to accommodate groups on the 
basis of "predetermined" criteria. These 
criteria define the "corporate" form of 
consociation which is based on ascrip-
tive criteria (ethnicity, national group, 
religion, etc.) assuming that "group 
identities are fixed and that groups are 
both internally homogeneous and exter-
nally bounded" (McGarry and O'Leary 
2005: 675). A predetermined or corpo-
rate consociation "privileges such iden-
tities at the expense of those group iden-
tities that are not accommodated" and 
that go beyond predetermined identi-
ties (McGarry and O'Leary 200%. 675). 
On the other hand, "self-determined" 
criteria forms the liberal consociation 
which allows "groups to manifest them-
selves instead of deciding in advance 
on the identity of the groups" (Lijphart 
1995: 275). According to McGarry and 
O'Leary (2006: 675-676) self-determi-
nation also takes care "to ensure that the 
rights of individuals as well as groups 
are protected".
Considering these arguments, O'Flynn 
(2010: 286-287) favours self-determina-
tion against predetermination, arguing 
that it is more "flexible" and suitable 
"for future changes", and that it "leaves 
people free to decide for themselves". 
Nevertheless, some clarifications about 
the theoretical and empirical borders 
between centripetalism and self-deter-
mined consociation might be necessary 
in the future.4 Are O'Flynn's arguments 
on the flexibility of self-determined con-
sociation always valid or could they be 
a tool for integrationist theorists and 
policy-makers? What happens when it 
comes to practical challenges that rely 
upon a clear ethnic split creating two 
different politics of 'understanding de-
mocracy?'
4 Indeed, some empirical cases, mainly 
regarding B-H, show that "liberal consocia-
tion leads to the degradation of consocia-
tion in general, which raises the question if 


































































Assuming that B-H has passed from 
corporate to liberal consociation, with 
clear centripetal tendencies, these theo-
retical reflections are a tool for a better 
understanding of the study that tries to 
confirm these processes and theoretical 
assumptions.
The roots: Bosniak-Croat 
relations in 1990s, the OHR 
and moderate governments
On 1 December 2016 the Constituti-
onal Court annulled several parts of 
the Election Law of B-H concerning 
the election of delegates to the Hou-
se of Peoples of the federal parliament. 
After that, the political crisis between 
Bosniaks and Croats deepened. The re-
presentatives of the two peoples have 
been proposing asymmetrical solutions 
to the Court judgement ever since. Ne-
vertheless, this crisis could be described 
as persistent since the 1990s. Indeed, the 
different visions of the political system 
of B-H led to war between Bosniaks and 
Croats. Since then, Bosniak leadership 
have tried to forcibly stop any attempt of 
power-sharing, while Croat political le-
aders, on the contrary, have been trying 
to promote and preserve it.
Bosniak-Croat struggles in the 1990s
Before the devastating 1992-1995 war, 
the population census results in 1991 
recorded that the three largest ethnic 
groups were the Bosniaks5 (1.9 million, 
44% of all), the Serbs (1.4 million, 31%) 
and the Croats (760,000, 17%). All ot-
hers (350,000, 8%)6 were the remaining 
ethnicities or unaffiliated individuals 
(Tabeau and Bijak 2005: 188). Only two 
of the three ethnic groups, the Bosniaks 
and the Croats, expressed their will to 
vote in favour of B-H independence at 
5 Known as Muslims until 1994 (Hayden 
2005: 229). 
6 Hayden (2005: 235) defines them "Yugo-
slavs and others".
the 1992 referendum, while the Serbs 
opted to abstain, thus showing their de-
sire to remain in Yugoslavia. However, 
the Bosniaks and the Croats, due to the-
ir very different population proportions, 
have persistently had a different view 
of B-H political system (Hayden 2005: 
238-241).
Before the total escalation of the war 
in February 1992, the European Com-
munity (EC) proposed a 'Statement on 
the principles of a new constitutional 
solution for B-H', also known as Cutilei-
ro plan. The plan sought to define B-H 
as a country of "three constitutive units 
defined primarily by ethnic principles", 
which consisted of non-contiguous can-
tons (Burg and Shoup 1999: 110-111). 
The Cutileiro plan confirmed that B-H 
"would have all the attributes of a sin-
gle state, including its own currency, a 
single system of defence, a single for-
eign policy, and a single legal-judicial 
system" (111). Despite the fact that at 
the beginning all three sides agreed, the 
Bosniak leader Alija Izetbegović refused 
to sign due to at least two reasons: first, 
he openly stated that he was against the 
"ethnic division of Bosnia", and second, 
because he was aware that the United 
States (U.S.) would push through the 
recognition of his government, which 
would enable him gain power through 
a more centralistic B-H political system 
(Burg and Shoup 1999: 113-115). On 
the other hand, Croat leaders accepted 
this "'consociational' proposal" (Harland 
2017: 9) because it permitted facilitat-
ing relations with Croatia and provided 
great autonomy for Croat-majority ar-
eas. This was in a serious disagreement 
with the vision of B-H political system 
and it "fuelled the conflict between Bos-
niaks and Croats" (Keil 2012: 211).
Initially, Bosniak and Croat leaders 
sought to establish both a defence and 
political coalition against the Serbs, who 


























emy and aggressor. While Croatia expe-
rienced the war first, the "Bosnian Mus-
lim community generally lagged behind 
the Bosnian Croat community in the 
creation of defence forces" (Shrader 
2003: 32). On 22 July 1992 the Croa-
tian President Franjo Tuđman and the 
Chairman of the tripartite Presidency of 
B-H Alija Izetbegović signed the "Agree-
ment on Friendship and Cooperation 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia". Signing the 1992 Agreement 
on Friendship, the Bosniaks and the 
Croats agreed on both military and po-
litical power-sharing. Three significant 
elements were decided: first, as the main 
Croat civil and military organisation 
in B-H, the Croatian Defence Council 
(HVO), was a component of common 
B-H forces "having its representatives in 
a joint command of the armed forces of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina". Second, that 
the "future state system of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will proceed from the prin-
ciple of full equality of three constituent 
nations: Muslims, Croats and Serbs". 
Finally, it was decided that the "consti-
tutional-political system of the country 
will be based on constituent units in the 
establishment of which due account will 
be taken of national, historical, cultural, 
economic, traffic and other elements" 
(Agreement on Friendship 1992, quoted 
in: Trifunovska 1994: 656-657).7
7 Some authors interpret the 1992 Agreement 
on Friendship as a confirmation of Croatia 
agreeing to the HVO being under the com-
mand of Armed forces of B-H, or even the 
Bosnian Territorial Defence Force, which 
became the Bosniak-majority Armija BiH 
(see Hoare 1997; Ramet 2006). For example, 
Hoare (1997) writes that "on 21 July 1992 
Tudjman signed a military pact with Izetbe-
govic in which the HVO was placed under 
the command of the Bosnian TO (Territo-
rial Defence)". This is simply untrue. The 
fact is that the Agreement of Friendship was 
signed on 21 July 1992 believing it would be 
a joint HVO-Armija commando (Agree-
ment on Friendship, quoted in: Agreement 
on Friendship 1992, quoted in: Trifunovska 
Contrary to agreed military and po-
litical power-sharing, on 6 August 1992 
Bosniak leaders unilaterally signed the 
"Legislative Decree on Amendments 
to the Decree on Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" 
which was opposed to the 1992 Agree-
ment on Friendship signed several weeks 
1994: 656-658; Shrader 2003: 66), which 
was unacceptable for Bosniak leaders who 
would accept neither military nor political 
power-sharing, as they had the majority 
of the population and sought to preserve 
political power. Indeed, only a few weeks 
later, on 6 August 1992 Izetbegović signed 
the "Legislative Decree on Amendments to 
the Decree on Armed Forces of the Repu-
blic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" that de 
facto annulled the Agreement on Friends-
hip placing HVO under a unique Armija's 
command. Furthermore, it should be taken 
into consideration, as noted in Burg and 
Shoup's (1999: 229-230) description of the 
Vance-Owen Plan, that "Croats sought to 
resolve the issue of military deployments 
under the Vance-Owen Plan by proposing 
that all military units in the provinces 
designated as Croat-majority provinces be 
placed under the control of the Bosnian 
Croat army (HVO) provincial command 
structures. They also sought that these be 
unified under a single HVO command for 
all Croat majority provinces. A parallel 
arrangement would have been established 
in Muslim-majority provinces", while on 
the state level HVO and Armija should have 
had a "joint command". On the other hand, 
"Muslims insisted that only a single unified 
command for all of Bosnia-Herzegovina be 
established above the level of the provin-
ces" (Burg and Shoup 1999: 229-230). This 
different vision of armed forces' organisa-
tion in deeply divided societies is nothing 
new: for example, in 1963 Makarios' Thir-
teen Amendments prescribed a complete 
unification of Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
military commands and headquarters, inc-
luding a "complete integration of the two 
ethnic communities at all levels of the mili-
tary hierarchy", which was perceived very 
negatively by the Turkish Cypriot minority 
that protested against the unilateral deci-
sion implemented by the Greek majority, 
because this led towards a possible exclu-
sion of Turkish soldiers (Adams 1966: 485). 

































































earlier. In fact, instead of the principle 
of equality in the commando, the Leg-
islative Decree recognised the HVO as 
a component of Armija BiH, but HVO 
was "placed under a unique command 
of the Armija BiH" (Legislative Decree 
1992, quoted in: Šiber 2000: 306-307). 
This decision had clear repercussions 
on common civil and military organisa-
tions. For instance, in the second part of 
1992, Bosniak local representatives ob-
structed HVO civil and military struc-
tures, while some were openly blamed 
by Bosniak leaders for opposing the 
separation from HVO (Shrader 2003: 
66; Marijan 2006: 386).
Bosniak leaders did not accept po-
litical power-sharing between Bosniak 
and Croat organisations, whereas the 
Croats insisted on it. This also included 
territorial subdivision on clear ethni-
cally-based regions (Keil 2012). Their 
mistrust was influenced by different fac-
tors that could be summed up reading 
certain authors' interpretations. Firstly, 
Malcom (1994: 240) states that Izetbe-
gović was reluctant to cooperate with 
Croats because "he feared an eventual 
absorption of Bosnia into a Greater Cro-
atia". Friedman (2004: 123) thinks that, 
contrary to B-H Serbs and Croats, the 
"Bosnian Muslims were the only group 
in Bosnia that publicly stated a desire for 
a united Bosnia", although certain Croat 
authors claim that the Croats were also 
for a united B-H, but highly decentral-
ised, while the Serbs sought to be part 
of a unique Serbian state (see e.g. Lučić 
2013; Arlović 2017). Secondly, certain 
authors argue that, paradoxically, the 
belated "official recognition of the Bos-
nian Muslims made them vulnerable 
to Serb and Croat pressures, because 
neither group would accept the Bos-
nian Muslims as anything more than a 
religious entity – certainly not as a na-
tional entity" (Friedman 1996: 1). These 
geopolitical views were further boosted 
by meetings between Tuđman and Serb 
leader Slobodan Milošević in the spring 
of 1991, which were interpreted by some 
journalists and scholars as secret meet-
ings for the partition of Bosnia (Mal-
colm 1994: 232-233; Friedman 1996, 
2004; Murdy, 1999: 342). In fact, some 
Bosniak leaders and intellectuals per-
ceived Croatia and Serbia as opportun-
ists and worried that "like their interwar 
predecessors Maček and Cvetković in 
1939, Tudjman and Milošević conspired 
together in the turmoil to carve up Bos-
nia and Herzegovina without Muslim 
input" (Friedman 1996: 214). Conse-
quently, power-sharing had generally 
been perceived and described by Bos-
niak leaders as a mechanism that threat-
ens the country's integrity and puts their 
identity at risk, while the Croats charac-
terised it as system which would permit 
them to preserve political autonomy and 
equality being the less numerous con-
stituent people in B-H.
The general perception about Serb 
and Croat aspiration for partitioning 
B-H, which was also perceived as a 
threat for the affirmation of the Bosniak 
identity, and the presence of Bosniak 
refugees in Central Bosnia and North-
ern Herzegovina demographically pres-
surizing Croatian-majority municipal-
ities (Shrader 2003: 3-4, 13) combined 
with the political polarization between 
the two groups resulted in war and in up 
to now irreconcilable political tensions 
between Bosniaks and Croats.
From the Washington Agreement to 
the OHR's centripetal impositions
The 1992-1994 Bosniak-Croat War 
ended after the two sides signed 
the U.S.-sponsored 1994 Washin-
gton Agreement that formed the Bo-
sniak-Croat Federation as a partial state 
based on prototypical corporate conso-
ciational arrangements (Belloni 2007: 


























agreement preceded joint Bosniak-Cro-
at military offensives, which led to the 
1995 Dayton Agreement and the end 
of war in B-H (Burg and Shoup 1999: 
346-347). The Dayton Agreement also 
set up the Office of the High Represen-
tative (OHR), an international institu-
tion that reports to the United Nations 
Security Council. The OHR gradually 
became one of the most important sta-
te-building international institutions in 
B-H. Indeed, the OHR was only a "civi-
lian advisory" international institution. 
In 1997, at the Peace Implementation 
Conference in Bonn the OHR was given 
executive (Bonn) powers which permit 
the High representative to implement 
constitutional laws, decisions, acts, and 
appoint or dismiss officials, without le-
gislators approving of such decisions 
(Van Willigen 2010).
The 1994 Washington Agreement 
enabled the creation of 10 cantons, pre-
scribed the structure of government as 
well as the division of responsibilities 
between the central government, can-
tonal and municipal authorities. Moreo-
ver, signing the Washington Agreement, 
the Bosniaks and the Croats also accept-
ed the Constitution of the Federation. 
The power-sharing system was the key 
condition for appointing executives and 
legislatures. According to the Washing-
ton Agreement (1994), the legislature is 
defined as follows:
"1. Legislature shall consist of two ho-
uses:
a. The House of Representatives, whi-
ch shall be elected democratically on 
a proportional basis in the Federation 
as a whole;
b. The House of Peoples, which shall 
have an equal number of Bosniak 
and Croat delegates. Each canton 
shall be allocated a number of seats 
to be occupied by Bosniak delegates 
and a number of seats to be occupied 
by Croat delegates, in proportion to 
these two groups in the Legislature of 
that canton, the Bosniak and Croat 
delegates from each canton are to be 
elected, respectively, by the Bosniak 
and Croat representatives in its Legi-
slature".
Until 2000, electoral rules were com-
patible with consociational mecha-
nisms of the Federation's Constitution 
based on the Washington Agreement 
that defined its legislature. Despite this, 
the OHR ignored the functionality of 
consociational arrangements for the 
election of the federal House of Peo-
ples and opted for a centripetal model, 
including inter-ethnic accommodation, 
integrationist policies, and open support 
given to moderate coalitions. In 2000, 
intra-ethnic voting prescribed by the 
Washington Agreement was substituted 
by inter-ethnic voting so that "every-
body voted for everybody" (Kasapović 
2016: 178; Bose 2002). Or, as described 
by McCrudden and O'Leary (2013b: 
73), "almost immediately after the ink 
had dried on the Agreement, 'the inter-
national community began pushing for 
reforms' that sought to move the Bos-
nian arrangements from being consoci-
ational to integrationist in nature".
For a long time, the leading B-H Cro-
at political leaders stressed that the new 
rules have nothing to do with the orig-
inal version of the Washington Agree-
ment, mainly because "Bosniak cantonal 
legislators, who make up the majority 
of members of the ten cantonal assem-
blies, would heavily influence the elec-
tion of Croat members of the House" 
(Kasapović 2016: 178), and consequent-
ly, it had an impact on the formation of 
executives. On the other hand, integra-
tionist behaviour of Bosniak politicians, 
who supported the amendments of the 
Washington Agreement, is often ex-
plained through the argument of a po-

































































Croatia and Serbia would play the roles 
of Germany and Russia (Belloni 2007: 
43). In order to avoid this scenario, 
"Muslims have tended to be supportive 
of international efforts to reintegrate the 
country", which also meant supporting 
integrationist parties (Hoare 2007: 408).
The visible switch from classic conso-
ciational, as defined by the 1994 Wash-
ington Agreement, to centripetal-like 
rules following OHR impositions in 
2000s, can easily be traced by consider-
ing two major changes that affected the 
nomination of delegates in the Federa-
tion's House of Peoples.
First, the Washington Agreement pre-
scribed that "Bosniak and Croat dele-
gates from each canton are to be elected, 
respectively, by the Bosniak and Croat 
representatives in its Legislature". How-
ever, after OHR's intervention in 2000 
this fundamentally changed and it was 
allowed voting for delegates who were 
not from the same ethnic group. New 
rule proposed by the OSCE Ambassa-
dor Robert Barry (consequently known 
as the "Barry's Amendments") regulated 
the election of members to the Feder-
ation's House of Peoples and "decreed 
that all members vote for all candidates, 
so that Croats would vote for Bosniak 
representatives and vice versa" (Belloni 
2004: 344).
Second, "Barry's Amendments" were 
valid for the election in 2000, but since 
then some other constitutional amend-
ments have been imposed. The 1994 
Washington Agreement stated that 
"each canton shall be allocated a num-
ber of seats to be occupied by Bosniak 
delegates and a number of seats to be oc-
cupied by Croat delegates, in proportion 
to these two groups in the Legislature of 
that canton", and the first Constitution 
of the Federation prescribes that "there 
shall be at least one Bosniak, one Croat, 
and one Other Delegate from each Can-
ton that has at least one such member 
in its Legislature". Interestingly, after 
following through the OHR's constitu-
tional amendments,8 the number of del-
egates diminished from 30 for Bosniaks 
and Croats to 17 for each of B-H's three 
constituent peoples and seven for Oth-
ers. These changes had a great impact 
on the nomination of the Government 
of the Federation and the President and 
Vice-Presidents of the Federation, main-
ly because the less numerous constitu-
ent peoples and Others have had minor 
possibilities to influence the election of 
these executive bodies. Indeed, the way 
in which the executive is elected has also 
changed, diminishing the possibility for 
Croats, Serbs and Others that took part 
in the decision-making process after 
2000, to influence the appointment of 
the executive and to use the veto as one 
of four principles of consociation when 
appointing members to the government 
(cf. Bennett 2016: 220-222).
The moderate governments
After the war, the international com-
munity started to question the integrity 
of the B-H political system. They were 
aware of the impossibility of building a 
functional state with a common insti-
tution. As concluded at the Bonn Peace 
Implementation Conference on 10 De-
cember 1997, one of the main problems 
was the "lack of strong multi-ethnic 
political parties and a structured civil 
society" that would influence the Peace 
Implementation Council – an interna-
tional body composed of main powers 
such as Canada, the European Commis-
sion, Russia, Turkey and the U.S. that 
advises the OHR – to recognise "the 
need to support the establishment of 
new multi-ethnic parties and to strengt-
hen the existing ones" (OHR 1997). The 
8 From 1994 to 2005, 108 amendments were 
adopted to the Constitution of the Federa-


























OHR were also given executive powers 
because they supported multi-ethnic 
parties and coalitions, which were im-
plemented through electoral enginee-
ring at the beginning of the 2000s.
In 2000, the international community 
introduced electoral rules in B-H based 
on "Horowitz's key conditions for pref-
erential social choice functions to pro-
duce cross-cleavage results" (Bunta 2018: 
105).9 In RS, an alternative voting system 
was introduced in order to launch mul-
ti-ethnic coalitions, accommodation and 
centrist politics, which relied on ethnic 
and nationalist parties instead of disinte-
gration. Similarly, in the Federation, the 
electoral rule changes based on Horow-
itz's key conditions for the election of del-
egates to the House of Peoples comprised 
cross-ethnic voting. These rules have per-
mitted the Bosniak members that have 
the majority of representatives in can-
tonal assemblies to nominate delegates of 
Croats as minor constituent people.10
The imposed electoral regulation 
amendments caused serious suspicion 
among Croat political leaders. Among 
the constituent peoples, the choice of 
supporting cross-ethnic coalition along-
side the winners has consistently caused 
suspicion even amid certain foreign 
authors. Bose (2002: 235) points out 
9 The main theorist of centripetalism, 
Donald Horowitz, confessed to Florian 
Bieber (2006: 148) that he was consulted 
by international institutions in B-H. Some 
electoral reforms were also introduced after 
consultation with Benjamin Reilly in Sara-
jevo, a promoter of Horowitz's approach 
(Arnautović 2009: 599; see in: Kasapović 
2016: 178). 
10 The article IV.A.2.8(1) of the Constitution 
of the Federation of B-H (2011) prescribes 
that "Delegates to the House of Peoples shall 
be elected by the Cantonal Assemblies from 
among their representatives in proportion 
to the ethnic structure of the population". 
So delegates to the House of Peoples are 
selected from among representatives in the 
cantonal assemblies. 
that B-H's population is not heteroge-
neous enough for elections based on 
cross-ethnic methods. Similarly, Belloni 
(2004: 345) writes that "the 2000 elec-
tion demonstrated that, while the inter-
national community had shown an in-
creasing interest in promoting moderate 
politicians, the ad hoc approach made 
intervention prone to failure".
Since Bosniak leadership knew it had 
"numbers on its side" (Bennett 2016: 
257), the decision made in 2000 has 
had repercussion mainly for the Cro-
ats in B-H. The Croat political elite was 
"in the weakest position and Croats are 
generally most disenchanted with the 
peace process" which was also influ-
enced by their "dwindling proportion" 
in BiH (Bennett 2016: 257). Even in-
fluential international actors, who have 
traditionally been against the interests 
of Croat leadership, often considered 
nationalistic, recognised how changes 
in electoral regulations "have evoked 
genuine concern by Croats that they 
risk being marginalised in a state where 
Bosniaks and Serbs enjoy special ad-
vantages" (ICG 1999: 53). Furthermore, 
Croat leadership protested at least twice 
following Croats' marginalization after 
electoral regulations were changed and 
engineered by the OHR.
Firstly, before the 2000 general elec-
tion, the international community 
isolated national parties by imposing 
"Barry's Amendments" and promoting 
the ten-party "Alliance for Change" co-
alition government (Hoare 2007: 408). 
Although the Croatian Democratic Un-
ion of B-H (HDZ) won 17.5%, the ma-
jority of Croat votes within the Federa-
tion, seats reserved for Croat members 
in the Government of the Federation 
were filled by members who won less 
than 2% (Manning 2004: 67). HDZ and 
its partners decided to create the Croat 
National Assembly (Hrvatski narodni 

































































that would operate as the Croat self-gov-
erning body" (Belloni 2007: 55). HNS 
withdrew from federal institutions and 
declared the Croat Self-Government by 
establishing a Croat-majority inter-can-
tonal and inter-municipal council (Bie-
ber 2001). However, the international 
community forced the Croats to annul 
this decision and to reintegrate into the 
Federation. After HDZ's rebellion and 
tensions, trust between the international 
community and Croat leaders was bro-
ken (Belloni 2004: 344).
Secondly, after the 2010 general elec-
tion, the OHR made a decision that, 
again, was not in sync with consocia-
tional principles. Again, the OHR sup-
ported moderate parties, regardless of 
their results. The OHR annulled the 
election results and the decision of the 
B-H Electoral Commission by imposing 
the "Platforma" coalition which includ-
ed the Social Democratic Party (SDP), 
the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), 
the People's Party Work for Better-
ment (NSRzB) and, paradoxically, the 
pro-ustasha far-right Croatian Party of 
Rights (HSP BiH).11 Similarly to 2000, 
the "Platforma" coalition excluded HDZ 
even though the party won the major-
ity of votes among the Croats (Central 
Election Commission 2010). Conse-
11 The Hrvatska stranka prava BiH (HSP BiH) 
is a far-right party whose ideological roots 
could be found in the 1941-1945 ustasha 
regime. After the first democratic election 
in 1990s, the HSP formed a paramilitary 
arm of the Croatian Defence Forces (HOS) 
which tried to annex B-H and re-create 
Croatian borders as they were during the 
Independent State of Croatia (NDH). Para-
doxically, SDP is a party that underlines its 
anti-fascist roots, but it accepted to make 
a coalition with HSP. Finally, in 2010, SDP 
led by Zlatko Lagumdžija met the coalition 
members in HSP's headquarters in Mostar. 
During the meeting, a bust of the ustasha 
leader Ante Pavelić was present alongside 
the main guest, which did not cause any 
complaints among Bosnian social-demo-
crats (Faktor.ba 2017). 
quently, HDZ initiated the revival of the 
HNS, this time as a party coalition that 
organised both political and non-gov-
ernmental affairs. The HNS did not quit 
the Federation's institutions; instead, 
its main members pursued a legal ac-
tion before the Constitutional Court to 
tackle the Election Law. As pointed out 
by Zdeb (2016: 559), this time the HNS 
was an "extra-constitutional represent-
ative institution" that started a "subtle 
long-lasting fight for equality of Croats 
in Bosnia, which also implied future 
constitutional change".
On the Bosniak political scene, new 
rules created serious tensions in the year 
2000. The Bosniak scene was composed 
of some right- and left-wing parties. 
The first had been traditionally devot-
ed to national identity building, often 
based on religious traditions, while the 
latter had often been defined as "mul-
ti-ethnic" or "civic". In fact, the SDA is 
a conservative and the most important 
right-wing Bosniak party. On the oth-
er hand, the civic bloc was composed 
of parties which inherited either liber-
al or social-democratic traditions. The 
most influential party is the reformed 
Communist Party, the SDP, which tries 
to keep links to Titoism and cross-eth-
nic appeals, although "this party pre-
dominantly attracts Bosniak voters" 
(Caspersen 2004: 575; Bieber 2006: 105). 
Following post-electoral pro-moderate 
engineering by the OHR in 2000, how-
ever, the SDA won the election among 
the Bosniak population. The party was 
excluded from the formation of the "Al-
liance for Change" coalition government 
(Manning 2004; Hoare 2007: 408). Since 
then, a strong ideological and political 
polarization among the Bosniak politi-
cal arena has persisted, including differ-
ent views towards the existence of enti-
ties and constituent peoples. While the 
conservative Bosniaks seek to preserve 


























and Serb winning parties within com-
mon institutions, the civic bloc calls for 
cross-ethnic cooperation and diminu-
tion of entities powers or even for their 
abolition (see Bose 2005).12
Contrary to the Croats, who have con-
sistently voted for the HDZ, in 2000 the 
Bosniaks were very largely represented 
by the SDP, which won 26 percent of 
seats in the Federation's lower House of 
Representatives (Central Election Com-
mission 2000). Moreover, contrary to 
the Croats who have been "the smallest 
group, and they do not have the institu-
tional protection offered by their own 
entity", which probably explains why 
their politicians pushed for the Croat 
Self-Government, the SDA proclaimed 
"itself to be 'a national/people's party 
of the political centre open for all citi-
zens of Bosnia and Herzegovina'" (par-
ty's final declaration at the Third SDA 
Congress, quoted in Caspersen 2004: 
576). This position can be interpreted 
as trying to become more politically ac-
ceptable to the international community 
in times when nationalist policies were 
sanctioned by the OHR.
Following the 2010 election, the SDA 
decided to accept to become part of 
the "Platforma" coalition government 
12 Tensions between the conservative and 
civic Bosniak bloc have persisted mainly 
due to ideological issues. For instance, 
Sarajevo's social-democrats tried to abolish 
the religion-course in schools, which resul-
ted in a fierce political reaction by the con-
servative forces (Pogled.ba 2011). However, 
as it will be argued further in the article, 
since the ECHR and the 2016 Constituti-
onal Court decisions, these Bosniak blocs 
have developed common strategies and 
have been acting as a mono-ethnic coali-
tion against all proposals made by Croatian 
parties. Furthermore, as it will be argued 
later, since then these parties have suppor-
ted each other with common proposals for 
the Election Law reform based mainly on 
cross-ethnic voting models, mainly con-
cerning the representation of constituent 
peoples.
together with the civic parties and the 
HSP. This action was negatively per-
ceived by the HNS coalition, which saw 
the coalition as a Bosniak bloc against 
the Croat community.
ECHR and Constitutional Court 
judgments on electoral rules
Electoral rules in B-H have been con-
tested for decades by all ethnic groups 
and minority members. It is possible 
to distinguish two opposed groups and 
types of contestations: (1) minority gro-
ups, which contested the impossibility 
of running for the tripartite Presiden-
cy of B-H, and (2) constituent peoples, 
which contested the majoritarian rules 
that exists for the election of certain in-
stitutions initially thought to be based 
on consociational arrangements.
Minority groups and electoral 
rules: the Sejdić-Finci v. B-H 
and Zornić v. B-H cases
Members of the Roma and the Jewish 
communities, Dervo Sejdić and Jakob 
Finci, expressed concerns about the im-
possibility of running for tripartite Pre-
sidency and the upper chamber of the 
state parliament (the House of Peoples), 
reserved only for members of the three 
main ethnic groups (Bosniaks, Croats 
and Serbs) according to the Election 
Law. The lawsuit was rejected by dome-
stic courts. Although one could argue 
that "political discrimination suffered by 
Others is very limited, especially when 
considered in the context of preserving 
the stability of democratic institutions 
and peace among the significant se-
gments of Bosnian society" (Stojanović 
2018: 350), the ECHR accepted it and 
in 2009 they issued a sentence that has 
obliged B-H to reform their political in-
stitutions and permit to non-members 
of the three ethnic groups to be appo-

































































The same happened to Azra Zornić, a 
Bosnian citizen who claimed she was dis-
criminated against because the electoral 
rules obliged her to plead as a member of 
one of three constituent peoples in order 
to run for election to the House of Peo-
ples. Zornić insisted on declaring herself 
as a Bosnian citizen, without affiliating 
to any constituent people. The ECHR's 
verdict in 2014 was the same as in the Se-
jdić-Finci verdict (ECHR 2014).
The two decisions by the ECHR chal-
lenged consociation both in practice and 
theory. Considering the practical aspect, 
the Sejdić-Finci judgment has become 
an explicit bureaucratic requirement for 
the path towards the European Union 
(EU). The ECHR asked B-H politicians 
to amend the constitution according to 
the Sejdić-Finci judgment, which has 
also become an EU request (Milanović 
2010: 640-641). However, this judgment 
remains unimplemented. Furthermore, 
McCrudden and O'Leary (2013a: 496, 
2013b: 130-131) argue that the apparent 
"civic model" decided by the ECHR "is 
not neutral", since it "took sides in fa-
vour of the Bosniak position and against 
the Bosnian Croats and (particularly) 
the Bosnian Serbs". In fact, by trying to 
limit power-sharing since 1990s, Bos-
niak leaders have called for "a more 
integrated country along the lines of 
'one man, one vote' principle" (Belloni 
2007: 55) and tried to implement the 
ECHR's judgment by using this formu-
la. Besides, the Sejdić-Finci verdict that 
favours a liberal vision of human rights 
over consociational norms (McCrud-
den and O'Leary 2013b) goes hand in 
hand with Bose's descriptions of "some 
sectarian Bosniak political figures who 
want to appear 'liberal' to Westerners 
– distinguishing them both from eth-
no-nationalists in their own group and 
from the incorrigibly nationalist 'enemy' 
group(s)" (2005: 325). It is clear that af-
ter the war more and more actors have 
expressed a tendency to undermine and 
even blame consociational arrange-
ments, not only in B-H, but at the inter-
national level where many theorists and 
policy-makers state that consociation is 
undemocratic (cf. Lijphart 2018: 9).
Theoretically, the ECHR's decisions 
fit in what McCrudden and O'Leary 
(2013a: 483) describe as "two different 
understandings of equality" when con-
sociation is put under pressure by an 
"individualised and majoritarian con-
ception of equality" although it seeks 
to further "equality between the con-
sociated peoples or groups". A second, 
less studied impact on consociational 
theory concerns different understand-
ings of democracy. In fact, interpreters 
of democracy's definitions have become 
"exclusivists" and prompted to clashes, 
which dissolves consociation's theoreti-
cal relevance and increases integration-
ist approaches. Explaining the ECHR's 
judgments, theorists ignore and un-
dermine consociation as a democratic 
approach. While Lijphart (2018: 9) de-
fends consociation arguing that "there is 
nothing undemocratic about consocia-
tionalism", Stojanović (2018: 350) points 
to the ECHR's judgment stating that 
it "might have consequences for other 
consociational regimes as well". Wheat-
ley (2012: 173) suggests that the ECHR 
finds that "discrimination in the enjoy-
ment of political rights on grounds of 
race or ethnicity could not be justified in 
any circumstances: the political equality 
of citizens is a 'constitutional preroga-
tive' in democratic states". The construc-
tion of an "archetypal democratic state" 
based on individuals' equality presumes 
the exclusion of power-sharing, because 
it focuses exclusively on individuals, 
not on (ethnic) groups (Wheatley 2012: 
172). This way, the ECHR has posed a 
threat to the idea of consociation as a 
legitimate tool for reconciling divided 


























mocracy and at the same time preserve 
the segments' equal representation.
Paradoxically, certain authors argue 
that the ECHR's judgments reopened 
the "Croat question". Efendić (2013) ob-
serves that "Bosnia Solves 'Croat Ques-
tion' at Sejdic-Finci's Expense" since 
international actors became aware of 
the problem that on some occasions the 
Croats were outvoted. According to Bun-
ta (2018: 141), after the imposition of the 
centrist government in 2000, "Croats ad-
vocated that there was a hole in the Day-
ton agreement when it came to the imple-
mentation of consociational theory via 
segmental autonomy. The Croat elites do 
not have a problem with consociational 
theory itself; rather, they believe their au-
tonomy is not safeguarded like the Serbs 
and Bosniaks". He argues that "the Croat 
elite took advantage of the European au-
dience eager to hear propositions for re-
form" and have found a "loophole" in the 
Sejdić-Finci logic, which pushed them to 
appeal to the Constitutional Court com-
plaining that the electoral mechanism for 
the election of the federal House of Peo-
ples violates the state's constitution (Bun-
ta 2018: 144-146).
Constitutional Court judgment: 
"The principle of legitimate 
democratic representation"
After the decisions on "individual rights" 
made by the ECHR, the Constitutional 
Court took a decision in favour of con-
stituent peoples, the decision U-23/14.
The most recent Court decision is 
related to the House of Peoples of the 
Federation's bicameral parliament. 
The House of Peoples is composed of 
54 members: 17 Bosniak delegates, 17 
Croat delegates, 17 Serb delegates and 
seven delegates that represent the "Oth-
ers". The aforementioned delegates are 
appointed by the representatives of 10 
Federation's unicameral cantonal as-
semblies. Each cantonal assembly has 
the right to appoint a number of dele-
gates as defined by the Election Law.
In 2014, Božo Ljubić, as Chairman of 
the House of Representatives of the Par-
liamentary Assembly of B-H and HNS 
representative, requested the revision 
of the constitutionality of the Election 
Law. On 1 December 2016, the Consti-
tutional Court adopted decision number 
U-23/14, establishing the unconstitution-
ality of rules on the election of members 
of the upper house of the Bosniak-Cro-
at Federation's Parliament, the House of 
Peoples. The Constitutional Court de-
clared parts of Article 10.12(2) ("all con-
stituent peoples are given one mandate in 
each canton") and Article 20.16.A (a-j) 
(which prescribe the number of delegates 
for each constituent people and Others 
from all the cantons) as non-compliant 
to Article I(2) of the Constitution of B-H 
on democratic principles (Constitutional 
Court of B-H 2016, Election Law 2018).
The two articles of the controversial 
law are directly linked to the OHR's in-
tervention in the early 2000s. Namely, 
they were related to the 2001/02 rule 
of decreasing the number of House of 
Peoples' delegates from 30 to 17 for Bos-
niaks and Croats.13 This rule substitut-
ed the centripetal decision, the "Barry's 
Amendments" valid in 2000 based on 
cross-ethnic voting method, that per-
mitted all cantonal assemblies' members 
to vote for the appointment of delegates 
to the House of Peoples – independently 
of their ethnic affiliation. 
In fact, by diminishing the number 
of delegates from 30 to 17, members 
of the smallest constituent people suf-
fered since their veto rights depended 
on delegates appointed by one ethnic 
13 In 2002 it was given the possibility to 17 
delegates for Serbs and seven for Others. 
Before, according to the Federation's con-
stitution, these two groups until 2002 had 

































































majority from cantonal assemblies. This 
leads to a situation where the less nu-
merous groups sometimes have not a 
single elected representative. Moreover, 
less numerous constituent peoples and 
Others have been denied the possibility 
of legitimately influencing the appoint-
ment of the executive. According to the 
Election Law, in order to be elected to 
the House of Peoples, delegates can de-
clare themselves as members of a certain 
community even if up to then they were 
members of other ethnic communities.14
For instance, there are two dozen 
Croats in the Bosnian-Podrinje Can-
ton Goražde (FZS 2013). According to 
the law, seats in the House of Peoples 
of the Federation's Parliament had to 
14 This table is based on the summation of the 
number of delegates for each constituent 
people according to the Election Law article 
20.16.A (a-j) annulled by the Constitutio-
nal Court in 2016. For instance, from five 
cantons with Bosniak majority six Croat 
delegates are elected. The Election Law 
prescribed how many delegates for each 
constituent people and Others are elected 
from each canton (17 Bosniaks, 17 Croats, 
17 Serbs and seven Others). However, if 
for instance we sum the number of Croats 
from majority Bosniak cantons, there are 
from Una-Sana Canton one Croat, Tuzla 
one, Zenica-Doboj two, Bosnian-Podrinje 
Goražde one and Sarajevo one (Election 
Law 2018). So in total there are six of 17 
Croats that are elected from Bosniak-majo-
rity cantonal assemblies.
be filled so that at least one mandate 
is awarded to each constituent people. 
The absurd situation happened when 
the Bosniak-majority Bosnian-Podrinje 
cantonal assembly appointed an ethnic 
Bosniak who simply declared himself as 
a Croat delegate in order to be recruit-
ed to the Croat caucus in the House of 
Peoples.15
Discrimination affects all constitu-
ent peoples and Others when it comes 
to the appointment of delegates to the 
House of Peoples from cantons where 
they are a less numerous group. Vukoja 
15 This was the case of Edim Fejzić (Diaspora 
Party), an ethnic Bosniak and former sol-
dier of the Armija BiH, who was appoin-
ted as a Croat delegate (2014-2018). In the 
2014 election, his party won 677 votes in a 
canton inhabited by 24 Croats. Interestin-
gly, the Bosnian-Podrinje Assembly tried 
to appoint Muamer Omanović (SBB) as a 
Croat delegate, but he has often changed 
his "affiliation", sometimes declaring him-
self as Bosniak and other times as Croat. 
The same happened when the Una-Sana 
Canton appointed Mirvet Beganović, who 
fought the war as member of Fikret Abdić's 
paramilitary "People's Army". Beganović is 
the president of the assembly of the Asso-
ciation of Prisoners Western Bosnia, who 
have declared that they were tortured by the 
Armija BiH. The same applies to Serb dele-
gates from cantons with a Bosniak or Croat 
majority, but also for Bosniak delegates 
elected in certain Croat-majority cantonal 
assemblies (N1 2016).
Table 1. Number of delegates in the Bosniaks', Croats', Serbs' and Others' Clubs (ca-
ucuses) in the Federation's Parliament elected from cantons with Bosniak or Croat 
majority and from mixed population cantons (Vukoja 2013: 99)14
Cantons Bosniaks Croats Serbs Others Total
Cantons with Bosniak 
majority 12 6 12 5 35
Cantons with Croat 
majority 3 5 3 0 11
Mixed cantons 2 6 2 2 12


























(2013: 99) argues that the appointment 
of delegates to the House of Peoples of 
the Federation's Parliament depends 
on the number of delegates appointed 
from Bosniak, Croat or mixed cantons. 
Being the majority, Bosniaks obviously 
influence the elections of Croat, Serb 
and Others' delegates. Similarly, Croats 
could elect Bosniaks in Croat-majority 
cantons, but the impact would be minor, 
as elected Bosniaks from Croat cantonal 
assemblies are not very numerous com-
pared to non-Bosniak delegates elected 
from Bosniak-majority cantons.
Indeed, 35 delegates have been elect-
ed from the Bosniak-majority cantonal 
assemblies, 11 from Croat-majority can-
tons and 12 from mixed cantons. Each 
of the three constituent peoples has 17 
delegates selected from ten cantonal as-
semblies, while the Others have seven. 
However, due to the fact that the num-
ber of delegates for constituent peoples 
has been reduced from 30 to 17, based 
on a decision imposed by the OHR in 
2002, cantonal assemblies with Bosniak 
majorities could potentially appoint 
35 of the total of 54 delegates (65%), 
while Croat-majority assemblies could 
only appoint 11 of the total 17 delegates 
(20%) (Table 1).
In cantonal assemblies, Serbs and 
Others have even fewer possibilities of 
appointing their legitimate delegates 
from Bosniak and Croat majority can-
tons. In fact, 12 of the 17 Serbs have been 
elected from Bosniak-majority cantonal 
assemblies, three from Croat-majori-
ty cantonal assemblies and two from 
mixed cantons (Table 1). Since Serbs are 
a minority in all cantonal assemblies, it 
often happened that Bosniak and Croat 
majorities elected either their Serb-pup-
pets or ethnic Bosniaks or Croats who 
simply declare themselves as Serbs to 
the Federation's House of Peoples (Vu-
koja 2013: 98-99), a practice which was 
legal according to the Election Law until 
2016.
This kind of discrimination based 
on this type of outvoting has led to se-
rious outbreaks. For instance, in 2010 
six of the 17 delegates in the Croat 
caucus were elected in cantonal assem-
blies with Bosniak majorities (Vukoja 
2013: 99). Considering the Election 
Law changes and the decision of the 
international community, this was suf-
ficient to appoint the Government and 
the President of the Federation without 
considering the votes of the majority 
in the Croat caucus, which undoubt-
edly posed serious questions over the 
existence of consociational arrange-
ments in practice. Indeed, until the 
OHR's amendments in 2002 regarding 
the nomination of the President and 
Vice-Presidents, the Constitution of the 
Federation prescribed:
"In electing the President and 
Vice-President, a caucus of the Bos-
niak Delegates and a caucus of the 
Croat Delegates to the House of Peo-
ples shall each nominate one person. 
Election as President and Vice-Presi-
dent shall require approval of the two 
nominees jointly by a majority vote 
in the House of Representatives, then 
by a majority vote in the House of 
Peoples, including a majority of the 
Bosniak Delegates and a majority of 
the Croat Delegates".
After 2002:
"Article IV.B.2: In electing the Pres-
ident and two Vice presidents of the 
Federation, at least one third of the 
delegates of the respective Bosniak, 
Croat or Serb caucuses in the House 
of Peoples may nominate the Presi-
dent and two Vice-presidents of the 
Federation".
Thus, by controlling six of the 17 del-

































































to the Serb caucus and five of seven to 
the Others', Bosniak politicians are able 
to influence the election of Federation's 
executive.16
Following these dysfunctions, the 
Constitutional Court reached its deci-
sion in 2016. Contrary to the ECHR, 
which kept the focus on "individual 
rights", the "Constitutional Court re-
calls that according to the general prin-
ciple of democracy, the right to partic-
ipate in democratic decision-making is 
exercised through legitimate political 
representation, which has to be based 
on the democratic choice of those rep-
resented and whose interests are repre-
sented" (Constitutional Court of B-H 
2016: §47). Moreover, the Court recalls 
that "the connection between those who 
are represented and their political repre-
sentatives at all administrative-political 
levels is actually the one that gives the le-
gitimacy to community representatives" 
as well as that "the House of Peoples is 
not the house of federal units but the 
house of constituent peoples" (§50). This 
way, the Court chose to preserve the 
link between the electors (those repre-
sented) and their representatives elected 
through legitimate political representa-
tion. Therefore, when deciding on B-H 
Election Law, the Constitutional Court 
judged that such an election of delegates 
(that involves the principle that "all con-
stituent peoples are given one mandate 
16 It almost happened in 2011, but a delegate 
elected from a Bosniak canton, Elvira Abdić 
Jelenović, openly refused to take part in the 
engineering in order to favour the creation 
of a moderate civic coalition. She was san-
ctioned by her political party Democratic 
People's Union (Klix 2011). However, the 
engineering was concluded by the OHR, 
which implemented the "Platforma" coa-
lition led by SDP (Index.hr 2011). On the 
other hand, if the number of constituent 
peoples' delegates had remained the same as 
until 2002, or more then 17, the possibility 
of controlling one third of the Croat caucus 
would definitely have been minor.
in each canton") could not be democrat-
ic: political representation cannot be le-
gitimate because those represented and 
their interests are not guaranteed to be 
acknowledged.
Finally, although some Croat-major-
ity cantonal assemblies select delegates 
by outvoting Bosniaks, the fact that 
Bosniaks are able to select six of the 17 
Croats, but also 12 of the 17 Serbs and 
five of the seven Others to the House of 
Peoples (Table 1) permits them to form 
the Government of the Federation and 
to appoint the entity's president. Nega-
tive consequences are thus felt mostly by 
Croats within the Federation, who, con-
trary to Serbs, do not have their own en-
tity within B-H, and by the Others. The 
Constitutional Court decided that such 
practice is unconstitutional because it 
represents an example of undemocrat-
ic illegitimate political representation, 
indicating that the main consociational 
principles have been neglected.
Proposals of Election Law 
reform by B-H political  
actors
Since the delivery of the ECHR's jud-
gments, B-H political actors have not 
given any proposals concerning the 
implementation of these judgments. 
Similarly, as a consequence to the Con-
stitutional Court decisions, the political 
scene in B-H is split along ethnic lines 
between the Croats and the Bosniaks, 
reflecting the same divergence that has 
persisted since the 1990s.
The Croat proposal
The leading B-H Croat political coali-
tion HNS submitted its proposal (HNS 
2017) on amendments to the B-H Elec-
tion Law to the Parliamentary Assembly 
of B-H on 28 April 2017. The proposal 
is based on an ethno-territorial model 


























the Presidency of B-H, the Federation's 
House of Peoples as well as the executive 
authorities of the City of Mostar.17
For the election of the two presidents 
(Bosniak and Croat), the model suggests 
the creation of electoral areas A, B and C 
defined as one constituency of the Fed-
eration. The electoral area A would be 
composed of municipalities with more 
than a 2/3 Bosniaks population. The 
electoral area B would be composed of 
municipalities in which there are more 
than 2/3 of Croats. The electoral area C 
would be composed of municipalities in 
which Bosniaks and Croats do not make 
up 2/3 of the population. The Bosniak 
member would be elected if they win 
the highest number of votes within the 
Federation if the sum of votes in areas 
A and C is greater than those in B and 
C. The same goes for the Croat member, 
except that they must win more votes in 
B and C than in A and C.
Concerning the House of Peoples, 
the Croat proposal accepts abolishing 
the Election Law Article 20.16.A (a-j), 
as well as a part of Article 10.12(2) ("all 
constituent peoples are given one man-
date in each canton"). This part of Arti-
cle 10.12(2) would remain deleted, while 
Article 20.16.A (a-j) would be based on 
the most recent population census and 
would stipulate the number as well as 
the way in which delegates are elected to 
the House of Peoples: 17 Bosniak dele-
gates would be appointed from the can-
tonal assemblies of seven Bosniak-ma-
jority and mixed cantons, 17 Croat 
delegates would be appointed from the 
cantonal assemblies of seven Croat-ma-
jority and mixed cantons. Similarly, 
17 Serb and seven delegates of Others 
would be nominated from cantonal as-
semblies where a relevant number of the 
listed peoples exist. The main argument 
used by Croat parliamentarians is that 
17 The election rule for the City of Mostar is 
not to be analysed yet.
this would guarantee legitimate political 
representation (HNS 2017).
The proposal was accepted by the 
House of Peoples of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of B-H on 19 July 2017. Of the 
15 delegates composed of five members 
for each constituent people, five Croat 
and three Serb members voted in favour 
of the bill, whereas four Bosniaks voted 
against it (Parliamentary Assembly of 
B-H 2017). Nonetheless, on 31 Janu-
ary 2018 the House of Representatives, 
composed of 42 members elected by 
proportional representation, rejected 
the proposal with 29 votes against and 
11 in favour, which meant that the Cro-
at proposal was rejected by the state's 
parliament (Parliamentary Assembly of 
B-H 2018).
The Bosniak proposal
Bosniak parties made two proposals. 
The first was proposed by the main Bo-
sniak party, SDA, on 15 November 2017. 
The SDA submitted its draft to the Par-
liamentary Assembly of B-H. Contrary 
to the Croats, the SDA did not try chan-
ging the rules for the election of the Pre-
sidency. Rather, it proposed a model for 
the distribution of seats in the Federa-
tion's House of Peoples and for the ele-
ction in the City of Mostar. Concerning 
the House of Peoples, the SDA proposal 
ignored the decision of the Constituti-
onal Court. The proposal was based on 
1991 population census and insisted on 
the re-implementation of some parts 
annulled by the Court, including Artic-
le 10.12(2) (Election Law 2018, Source.
ba 2017). It was rejected on 31 January 
2018 in the House of Representatives by 
33 votes against and seven in favour. All 
Serb and Croat representatives, as well 
as some non-SDA members voted aga-
inst the proposal (Parliamentary Assem-

































































The second, proposed by a coalition of 
civic parties including SDP, Democratic 
Front (DF) and Our Party (Naša Stran-
ka), whose voters are mainly Bosniaks 
(Bieber 2006: 105; Caspersen 2004: 575; 
Hulsey 2016: 57),18 has been supported 
by the conservative SBB and SDA. Con-
trary to the Croat and SDA proposals, 
this coalition did not submit a proposal 
of amendments to the Election Law to 
the state's parliament, but to the Feder-
ation's Parliament. Indeed, on 19 June 
2018 this large coalition of Bosniak 
parties submitted the proposal of the 
"Law on Constituencies and Number of 
Mandates of the Parliament of the Fed-
eration of Bosnia and Herzegovina" to 
the Federation's Parliament. This pro-
posal changed some boundaries and the 
number of seats for each constituency 
in the House of Representatives and it 
prescribed the number of seats for the 
House of Peoples. The proposal contains 
provisions that increase majoritarian 
ones both in the House of Representa-
tives and in the House of Peoples (Par-
liament of the Federation of B-H 2018).
Concerning the House of Represent-
atives, the Bosniak coalition proposes 
new constituencies and the number of 
mandates, which should change at least 
every 10 years, based on the size of the 
population, the number of citizens with 
residence permits (including minors), 
registered voters as well as geographical, 
18 SDP and Komšić are largely supported and 
voted by Bosniaks (Bose 2005; Bieber 2006: 
105; Caspersen 2004: 575; Hulsey 2016: 
56-57).  Hulsey (2016: 57), however, argues 
that Naša stranka "emerged to offer an alter-
native to ethnic politics that is neither burde-
ned by the socialist past of the SDP nor the 
history of Bosniak support". Its leader Boriša 
Falatar ran as a candidate for the Croat seat to 
the Presidency of B-H in the 2018 general ele-
ction. He campaigned in many Croat-majo-
rity municipalities and sent clear messages 
that he is a candidate for all, including Croats, 
while criticizing candidates to the Croat seat 
who sought only Bosniak votes (N1 2018).
administrative and historical criteria. 
According to the proposal, the num-
ber of representatives of Bosniaks as 
the most numerous constituent people 
would increase, whereas the number of 
other ethnic groups would decrease. For 
instance, taking into account the 2014 
general election results in relation to 
the Bosniak proposal the following cas-
es would be possible in constituencies: 
(a) where the number of deputies in the 
House of Representatives would remain 
the same, the Croats would have won 
4 of the possible 27 (14.8%) mandates; 
(b) where the number of deputies in 
the House of Representatives would in-
crease, Croats would have won 1 of the 
possible 22 (4.6%) mandates; (c) where 
the number of deputies in the House of 
Representatives would decrease, Croats 
would have won 10 of the possible 24 
(41.7%) mandates (calculation based 
on: Central Election Commission 2014).
Concerning the House of Peoples, 
the Bosniak proposal did not consider 
decision U-23/14 of the Constitutional 
Court. In fact, it maintained exactly the 
same model of election and number of 
delegates from each constituent people 
and Others, in all cantonal assemblies. 
Nevertheless, Bosniaks defended the 
design of the law stating that it is based 
on the Constitution of Federation of 
B-H, regardless of the fact that it is not 
in line with the Constitutional Court 
U-23/14 decision. Effectively, the Court 
expressed itself on the state Election 
Law and not on the Federation's Con-
stitution that still contains the provision 
that all constituent peoples are given one 
mandate in each canton,19 which is not 
19 Article IV.A.2.8(3) of the Constitution of 
the Federation of B-H prescribes: "In the 
House of Peoples there shall be at least one 
Bosniak, one Croat, one Serb from each 
Canton which has at least one such dele-
gate in its legislative body". This article was 
changed in 2002 by the High Representative 


























in line with the Constitutional Court de-
cision (Parliament of the Federation of 
B-H 2018).
The Serb position
Serbs are the least numerous constituent 
people within the Federation (2.5% of 
the population) affected by the Electi-
on Law in an unconstitutional manner. 
Although the Serbs have expressed con-
cern on the fact that their delegates can 
be controlled by either Bosniak or Croat 
majorities in cantonal assemblies (Table 
1), Serb parties and organisations have 
kept a distance without giving concrete 
amendment proposals. This can be also 
interpreted by the fact that Serbs have 
"their own" entity which tries to defend 
interests of all compatriots (Vecernji.hr 
2018).
In the Parliamentary Assembly their 
voting depends on their coalition with 
Bosniak and Croat parties at state level. 
The largest Serb party, Milorad Dodik's 
Alliance of Independent Social Demo-
crats (SNSD), publicly expressed its full 
support to the HNS proposal (Al Jazeera 
2017) and voted in favour in both cham-
bers, while Serb opposition members 
voted against the HNS proposal in the 
lower and abstained in the upper cham-
ber. On the other hand, all Serb parties 
voted against the SDA proposal (Parlia-
mentary Assembly 2017, 2018).
Proposals by non-governmental 
domestic actors
Proposals for changes of electoral rules 
by non-governmental domestic actors 
have been publically presented and dis-
cussed, but remain unimplemented.
Only few proposals were presented by 
domestic intellectuals and scholars. The 
first appeared in 2013, after U.S. Ambas-
sador Patrick Moon gathered Bosniak 
and Croat professors and intellectuals, 
known as the Expert Group.20 They 
presented 181 norms for constitutional 
reforms, which included a proposal for 
the modification of the decision-taking 
mechanism in the federal parliament. 
Indeed, item 55 on the draft presented 
on 7 May 2013 describes the role and 
relations between the two houses of par-
liament (Vukoja 2013: 99-100):
"The houses have separate sessions 
in which they decide about the issues 
that are discussed at a joint session. The 
House of Representatives decides by the 
majority of votes of its members, while 
the House of Peoples with the majority 
of delegates' votes, which include most 
Bosniak, most Croat and most Serb de-
legates".
However, the content of this proposal 
was changed "in dubious circumstances" 
and as such presented to the Parliament 
of the Federation on 29 May 2013. The 
content of the proposal sent to the state 
Parliamentary Assembly differs in its 
substance. Indeed, it prescribes that:
"The houses make decisions about 
the matters proposed at joint sessions 
in equal competencies but at separate 
sessions, in accordance with the Consti-
tution and the rules of procedure of the 
houses".
As in the greatest espionage stories, 
nobody knows who changed the orig-
inal version. This created confusion 
among the authors and politicians who 
have refused to consider the proposal 
20 The Expert Group was composed of 
Kasim Trnka (former Law Professor and 
judge at the Constitutional Court), Vahid 
Šehić (political analyst and Chairman of 
the Forum of Citizens of Tuzla), Mirjana 
Nadeždin-Defterdarević (Law Professor, 
University of Sarajevo), Mile Lasić (Politi-
cal Science Professor, University of Mostar) 
and Krešimir Zubak (former president of 
the wartime Herzeg-Bosnia, Federation of 


































































of the Expert Group.21 This substantial 
change reflects the crucial political di-
vergence between Bosniaks and Croats. 
Indeed, in the first version, parliamen-
tary decisions are taken by a simple ma-
jority in the House of Representatives 
and by majorities of all the three na-
tional caucuses in the House of Peoples. 
On the other hand, the second version 
submitted to the analysis of parliamen-
tarians stated that decisions are taken by 
simple majorities in both the House of 
Representatives and House of Peoples. 
The Croats protested because the second 
version enabled Bosniaks to control all 
legislative mechanisms since they could 
potentially dominate both houses of the 
Parliament.
The second proposal by civil society 
actors was drafted by the Institute for 
Social and Political Research (IDPI) and 
presented in Mostar on 8 June 2018. The 
IDPI is a domestic nonpartisan and in-
dependent think--tank whose mission is 
to enhance and develop expertise in the 
field of state organisation and govern-
ance. Its proposal is based on four basic 
principles: upholding the Dayton con-
stitution, protection of the constituent 
peoples' equality, the implementation of 
the Constitutional Court ruling and the 
possibility to participate and become a 
candidate for all levels of government 
during elections. The proposal offers 
different models for the election of the 
Federation's House of Peoples. One of 
them concerns the organisation of four 
Grand Electoral Colleges, composed of 
cantonal assemblies' members, which 
elects delegates to their own group in 
the House of Peoples (IDPI 2018).
21 Speculations over the motives and actors of 
the modification of Expert Group's docu-
ment created a sort of debate which divided 
the members and ended the existence of 
this group. 
Criticisms of the proposals
Instead of sparking off a substantial de-
bate, the proposals were heavily criti-
cised and politicised. Criticisms of the 
proposal reflect the ethnic lines as well 
as attitudes of Bosniaks and Croats on 
the state and its political system since 
1990s. As summarised by Kasapović 
(2018: 254), "Bosniaks support a radical 
review of the constitutional order which 
would transform B-H from an asym-
metrical consociational (con)federation 
into a unitary liberal state". On the ot-
her hand, Croats defend consociational 
arrangements "in the Federation as well 
as in the state since both political com-
munities are in minority".
Some hardliner Bosniak leaders 
deemed the Croat proposal a step to-
ward "the renewal of wartime Her-
zeg-Bosnia", "partition of Bosnia" and 
an attempt to reach "the ultimate goal 
of provoking organised violence" (Jabu-
ka.tv 2017). Šefik Džaferović, the SDA's 
current member of the B-H Presidency, 
gives a more moderate comment on the 
Croat proposal. First, he believes that the 
Croats "practically confirm and deep-
en discrimination already determined 
by the decisions of the ECHR", because 
they do not adhere to its regulations. 
Džaferović adds that they also "bring in 
additional ethnic divisions" and, final-
ly, that they are not treating the federal 
constitution with respect because they 
do not respect the provision which stip-
ulates that "from each canton, at least 
one representative of each constituent 
people must be delegated to the federal 
House of Peoples, if elected in cantonal 
legislative bodies" (SDA 2017). Further-
more, the SDA asked the Constitutional 
Court whether the HNS proposal was 
against Bosniaks' vital national interests. 
The Court rejected the SDA's appeal, ar-
guing that the HNS proposal is in com-
pliance with the constitution (Constitu-


























the main arguments used to criticise the 
proposal are related to seeking greater 
"ethnical division" within B-H and their 
"disrespect" of the federal constitution.
On the other hand, the Croats com-
plain that Bosniak proposals do not 
conform to the state's constitution. Cro-
at politicians accuse Bosniaks of "break-
ing the state, because they are trying to 
abolish state level powers" (Dnevnik.ba 
2018). Also, it could be argued that Bos-
niaks are doing everything in order to 
dissociate from the Dayton agreement 
and that their programmes have been 
"profiled as de facto anti-systemic and 
anti-constitutional actors" (Kasapović 
2018: 255). Croat representatives argue 
that the Bosniaks and the internation-
al community are predominantly try-
ing "to enforce political interpretations 
instead of legal ones, and here we are 
talking about the implementation of the 
Constitutional Court's decision" (Peace-
fare.net 2018). Furthermore, according 
to Croat public opinion, the Bosniaks 
are seeking to establish their own enti-
ty, like the Serbs in B-H, but without the 
Croats (Jabuka.tv 2018). When it comes 
to the content of the proposals, the Cro-
ats find them illegal, because they took 
unconstitutional rules of the Election 
Law and tried to apply them in the law.
Conclusion
Since the 1990s, the fate of the political 
system in B-H has depended on fixed 
national positions of the three con-
stituent peoples. There is no consen-
sus when it comes to the future of this 
type of democracy and political system. 
Using the example of Bosniak-Croat 
relations, article shows that the main 
liberal criticism of consociation, expre-
ssed by some international and dome-
stic figures who seek to abolish conso-
ciational arrangements, has also been 
marked by different understandings of 
democracy. Bosniak elites do not accept 
consociational arrangements, and they 
prefer majoritarian rules, whereas the 
Croats seek to preserve consociation wi-
thout accepting the centralization of po-
wer. In each other's eyes, some forms of 
democracy are unacceptable if they do 
not fit exactly into their views. The Bo-
sniaks do not accept consociation prin-
ciples as a form of democracy, arguing 
that the Croats are over-represented. On 
the other hand, the Croats perceive both 
Bosniak civic and conservative parties' 
majoritarian goals as their intention to 
apply domination, which is consequen-
tly rejected as a form of democracy be-
cause it is disrespectful of less numerous 
constituent groups' interests.
The Constitutional Court decision on 
the Election Law showed that the most 
numerous constituent people will not 
accept any attempt of power-sharing, 
while the less numerous constituent 
people seek to introduce a rule that also 
considers the territorial principle for 
amending the Election Law. According-
ly, proposals made by Bosniaks showed 
that they try to preserve the majoritar-
ian rules for the election of common 
institutions, especially for the federal 
upper house in which each national 
community should have the possibility 
of defending its specific interests. On 
the other hand, the Croats proposed 
electoral rules based on territoriality 
seeking to preserve and guarantee con-
sociational norms. In other words, "the 
current consensus on democracy is only 
principled since the three sides deeply 
disagree on whether B-H should have a 
liberal or consociational political order 
and whether it should be a democratic 
federation or a unitary state" (Kasapović 
2018: 254).
Finally, the article showed that the in-
ternational community has changed its 
initial approach from supporting and 
imposing consociational arrangements 

































































Having in mind the described example 
of the Election Law of B-H applied to 
Bosniak-Croat relations, this article 
showed that consociation is particu-
larly targeted by critics, both in theory 
and practice, as an "illegitimate" form 
of democracy. On the other hand, it 
seems that the Election Law's lesson 
and Constitutional Court's judgment 
on defining legitimate democratic rep-
resentation fit Lijphart's (2018: 9) words 
– which defend consociation as "more 
conducive to peaceful co-existence and 
probably also more fair and legitimate 
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Rat drugim sredstvima? Shvaćanja demokracije 
i izborni zakon Bosne i Hercegovine
Sažetak U članku se razmatraju politički učinci dvaju različitih shvaćanja demokraci-
je u etnički duboko podijeljenim društvima na primjeru izbornog zakona Bosne i 
Hercegovine, a koje zastupaju političke elite bošnjačke i hrvatske zajednice u zemlji. 
U prvom dijelu članka objašnjava se sukob bošnjačke i hrvatske političke elite oko 
modela većinske i konsocijacijske demokracije koji traje od devedesetih godina 20. 
stoljeća. U drugom dijelu razmatraju se odluke Europskog suda za ljudska prava 
i Ustavnog suda Bosne i Hercegovine o izbornim pravilima. Tvrdi se da su institu-
cionaliziranje centripetalističkih i suspendiranje konsocijacijskih aranžmana u iz-
bornom zakonu povećali političke podjele među dvjema etničkim zajednicama. U 
trećem dijelu raspravlja se o prijedlozima izbornih pravila što su podastrijeti držav-
nom i entitetskim parlamentima, koji potvrđuju postojanje nespojivih shvaćanja 
demokracije u bošnjačko-hrvatskoj Federaciji.
Ključne riječi Ustavni sud BiH, izborni zakon, bošnjačko-hrvatska Federacija, shva-
ćanja demokracije
